There are, however, several methodological advantages to using XL. First, the RNNE bid function is readily solved for XL, so that the experimenter continues to have a benchmark model of fully rational behavior against which to compare actual bidding. Second, XL provides a substantial amount of public information about x0 ... , while still maintaining an interesting auction.
We will examine the first claim, about the riskneutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bid function.
Kagel and We will demonstrate that (1) is not a Nash equilibrium bid function for n 3 bidders, and that there does not exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium bid function for n =2 bidders, when the lowest signal received by the bidders is public information.
A. Counterexample for n 2 3
Bid function (1) implies that the low signal holder always bids an amount equal to her signal (XL), which gives her an expected payoff of zero for n ! 3.4 We will show that (1) is not a Nash equilibrium bid function because, if all other bidders bid according to ( 1), then there exists an alternative bid function that gives the low signal holder positive expected payoff.
Suppose, contrary to equation ( Therefore, bid function ( 1 ) is not a Nash equilibrium bid function. 6 Kagel and Levin focused on the role that public information might play in a common value auction, particularly its effect on seller's revenue and the winner's curse. They tested six hypotheses, three of which involved predicted effects of public information. They also concluded that "... public information ... failed to raise revenues by the predicted amount, even in markets without a winner's curse" (Kagel and Levin, 1986 p. 913). But we have shown that the bid function they offer as a RNNE bid function for public information (in, addition to private signals) is not, in fact, an equilibrium bid function. Therefore, the conclusions that they draw about the relation between the observed and predicted effects of public information do not follow from the bidding theory in their article.
The preceding counterexample demonstrates that the reported equilibrium bid function is wrong, but it does not convey an intuition about the nature of the problem. A clear understanding of the source of the inherent problems with the low signal approach is needed in order to understand the implications of our comment for bidding theory, data analysis, and experimental methods. The following nonexistence proof provides the essential insight. We present the nonexistence proof for the special case of two bidders because of its simplicity and clarity.
B. Nonexistence for n = 2
We now show, for n = 2 bidders, that there does not exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium bid function for common value auctions in which the low signal is public information. Suppose that the low signal holder adopts the pure strategy 
IIe Implications for Common Value Auction Research
The problems that are inherent in the low signal, public information environment have implications for bidding theory, experimental methods, and data analysis.
A. Implications for Bidding Theory
The preceding analysis makes clear that the theoretical problem inherent in low signal public information is the information asymmetry that it creates: the other bidder(s) know as much about the low signal holder's valuation of the auctioned item as does the low signal holder. We have demonstrated that, with this information asymmetry, there does not exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium bid function for n = 2. The logic of the nonexistence proof can be extended to any finite n. Thus, the implication of our analysis for bidding theory is that an equilibrium bid function for the low signal, public information environment must involve a mixed strategy for the low signal holder. But mixed strategies are very difficult to apply to data, especially data for individual bidders. Thus our analysis can provide methodological guidance for experimental studies in these environments.
B. Implications for Experimental Methods
Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber (1982) demonstrated that public information increases Nash equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in a model with an exogenously determined number of bidders because it reduces item valuation uncertainty. An example of the type of public information that they modeled is announcement of an additional randomly drawn signal. Unlike the Kagel and Levin low signal environment, this information environment preserves symmetry among the n bidders, each of whom knows his own signal and the value of the n + 1 st (public) signal, and therefore it is an environment for which there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium bid function. Experimentalists studying the effects of public information are well advised to adopt such a symmetric approach in order to produce data with precise theoretical interpretations. The random signal design also has other advantages, such as variable sample sizes for both public and private information signals. Thus, one can use this approach to study the effects of more or less public information; for example, one can compare the effects of randomly drawn public signal samples of size 1 with those of, say, size 5. In public signal auctions, each bidder has a sample of size two, not one, from the uniform distribution of signals. Therefore, his maximum-likelihood estimate of the common value of the auctioned item is the midpoint between the two signals (ji), not the amount of his private signal that would be the estimate in a private signal auction. The correct measure of the conditional expected value of the auctioned item in public information auctions is E (x I| Hi = btH), the expected value of the auctioned item conditional on one's own midpoint being the highest of n midpoints; hence the correct measure of the winner's curse is bw -F (xoI |ii = PH).9 Therefore, the measure (B) results reported in Kagel and Levin's Table 6 are wrong since they involve an incorrect calculation of the winner's curse.10
C. Implications for Data

III Conclusion
In a widely cited paper, Kagel and Levin (1986) reported tests of six hypotheses, three concerned with the effects of public information and three concerned with the effects of private information on bidding in common value auctions (also see Kagel, 1995 pp. 536-60). We have shown that the low signal, public information bid function underlying their analysis is wrong and, furthermore, that there does not exist a pure-strategy equilibrium bid function for this information environment. The low signal, public information treatment has been introduced in other papers and used to interpret data in related work. Our theoretical analysis implies that this literature needs to be critically reexamined. As we have explained, the alternative random signal(s), symmetric information method for introducing public information is better because it is consistent with pure-strategy equilibrium bidding theory and permits a flexible design in which a researcher can vary the size of the public information sample.
Kagel and Levin also concluded that the winner's curse was ubiquitous in their private signal auctions with experienced subjects in which there were more than 3 or 4 bidders. They based this conclusion on calculations of the level of bidder profits and the number of bids greater than conditional expected value. While this is clearly relevant information, it does not tell the whole story because they did not report significance tests. We have conducted t-tests and Kolmogorov-Smirnov nonparametric tests and also used a bootstrapping technique to calculate p -values for the winner's curse measure that is appropriate for private signal auctions, which is bi -E (x, I xi= XH). The test results are reported in an Appendix available upon request to the authors. All three of our test procedures reveal a general absence of a significant winner' s curse in either "small" (n c 4) or "large" auctions. We conclude that there is some limited evidence of a winner's curse in the large auctions but that Kagel and Levin greatly overstated their conclusions about it. ' Complete derivations of conditional expected values of this type are contained in Cox and Stephen C. Hayne (1998). 0 A referee, while agreeing that there is a problem with the Kagel and Levin bid function for public information argues that the correct bid function might strengthen their conclusions about seller's revenue. Our point is that their conclusions do not follow from the theory in their paper and we do not speculate on how a correct theory might affect particular conclusions such as the effect of public information on seller's revenue. However we do suggest that the particular Kagel and Levin asymmetric information approach is problematic in that it requires use of an equilibrium involving a mixed strategy. This in turn would call for a fundamentally different approach to analyzing individual subject data.
